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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (j) (1994). Pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1994), this case was poured over to this 
Court by the Utah Supreme Court. This Court has jurisdiction of 
this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (1994). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Defendant and Appellee Lynn Transportation Co., Inc. 
("Lynn") is satisfied with the statements of the issues presented 
in Appellant's brief as issues 4 through 10. However, the first 
three issues identified by Appellant were not raised, briefed or 
argued below, and were therefore not preserved for this appeal. 
Accordingly, Lynn identifies the following additional issue on 
appeal: 
1. Did Appellant preserve the issue of whether the 
written agreement between Kirk H. Mower and Lynn and dated April 
12, 1990 was an integrated contract? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of 
material fact exists and the moving party is entiled to judgment 
as a matter of law. Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civ. Pro.; Hiaains 
v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). The standard 
of review in this Court for a trial court's granting of a summary 
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judgment is correctness. Hiaains, 855 P.2d at 235. The trial 
court's decision granting summary judgment can be affirmed based 
on any theory, even if such theory was not applied by the trial 
court. Id. The Court will not, however, reverse the trial 
court's decision based on theories not presented to the trial 
court. Franklin Fin.v. New Empire Dev. Co.. 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 
1983) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff and Appellant Kirk H. Mower ("Mower") contracted 
to be a truck driver for Defendant and Appellee Lynn 
Transportation Co., Inc. ("Lynn"). R. 298. Mower owned his 
truck and was an independent contractor. R. 298. While driving 
a load for Lynn, he was injured when his truck ran off the road. 
R. 301. Mower had no workers' compensation insurance for his 
company. R. 3 01. He filed suit against Lynn and its insurance 
agent, Defendant and Appellee Alexander & Alexander, Inc. 
("Alexander"), claiming that a single "X" mark on a form provided 
by Alexander to Lynn and filled out by Mower obligated Lynn and 
Alexander to obtain workers' compensation insurance for Mower. 
R. 300. He contended this form imposed this obligation 
notwithstanding his written contract with Lynn, which 
unambiguously required Mower to obtain such insurance and to 
indemnify Lynn for such claims. R. 3 01. 
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After considerable discovery and indeed, after Mower had 
certified that he was ready for trial, R. 385-386, Defendants 
moved for summary judgment. They submitted the contract between 
Lynn and Mower (executed on April 12, 1990) (the "Agreement") as 
undisputed evidence. R. 397 & 416-417. In addition, defendants 
submitted the following additional undisputed facts, which were 
not disputed (except as noted) by Mower, R. 465: 
1. In April of 1990, when Mower applied to be a driver 
for Lynn, Linda Granath of Lynn gave Mower a form to order 
liability and bobtail insurance. Defendants attached a copy of 
that form to their motion, and cited to Ms- Granath's deposition. 
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion For Summary Judgment 
("Defendants' Memo"), R. 398; Granath Deposition, R. 419-421. 
2. The form given Mower by Granath, in addition to boxes 
for bobtail and liability insurance, had a box at the bottom for 
"Workers' Compensation," which Mower checked. Defendants' Memo, 
R. 398; Granath Deposition, R. 418. 
3. The form was completed by Mower prior to the time 
when Mower signed the written contract with Lynn. Defendants' 
Memo, R. 398. Although Mower attempted to dispute this fact by 
quibbling that it was signed "as part of the same transaction," 
Mower submitted no evidence in support of this contention, and in 
fact, he contradicted this argument in his deposition, by 
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testifying that the form was signed before the Agreement. Mower 
Deposition, R. 467 & 424. Defendants attached excerpts from 
Mower's deposition to their motion. 
4. Prior to applying at Lynn Transportation, Mower had 
known Linda Granath and was friendly with her. Defendants' Memo, 
R. 398. 
5. Mower had a single, three-to-five minute conversation 
with Linda Granath concerning insurance generally, including 
workers' compensation insurance. Defendants' Memo, R. 3 98; Mower 
Deposition, R. 427, 428 & 434. 
6. Mower had no other conversations concerning insurance 
with any representative of Lynn or Alexander prior to his 
accident on July 28, 1990. Defendants' Memo, R. 399; Mower 
Deposition, R. 427 & 428. 
1. Linda Granath did not say she would obtain workers' 
compensation insurance for Mower's business. Mower admitted this 
in his deposition and did not dispute this fact with any evidence 
in the record. Defendants' Memo, R. 399; Mower Deposition, R. 
427. 
8. Defendants also submitted that, according to Mower, 
Linda Granath indicated that she would send in the form and 
Alexander would compute Mower's premium. Defendants' Memo, R. 
399; Mower Deposition, R. 426-427. 
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9. Defendants also submitted, and Mower did not dispute, 
that Ms. Granath faxed and mailed the form as filled out by Mower 
to Alexander. Defendants' Memo, R. 3 98. 
10. Mower never discussed the cost of workers' 
compensation insurance, other than the fact that it would be 
expensive, with any representative of Lynn or Alexander, 
including Linda Granath. Defendants' Memo, R. 3 99; Mower 
Deposition, R. 426-427. 
11. Mower never discussed how many employees he 
anticipated his business would have with any representative of 
Lynn or Alexander, including Linda Granath. Defendants' Memo, R. 
399; Mower Deposition, R. 427. 
12. Mower never discussed the issue of whether he, as 
opposed to merely his employees, would be covered under the 
supposed workers' compensation insurance policy. Defendants' 
Memo, R. 399; Mower Deposition, R. 427-428. 
13. Mower knew that the number of employees to be covered 
under a workers' compensation policy was important for purposes 
of making an application for such insurance. Defendants' Memo, 
R. 3 99; Mower Deposition, R. 431. 
14. Although amounts for "insurance" were deducted from 
the checks Mower was paid for his services as an independent 
contractor, Mower had "no idea" what sort of insurance these 
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deductions were for. Defendants' Memo, R. 400; Mower Deposition, 
R. 429. 
15. It was likewise undisputed, for purposes of the 
motion, that Mower was injured on the job on or about July 28, 
1990. Defendants' Memo, R. 400; Amended Complaint, 1 29, R. 301. 
16. On July 22, 1992, Timothy C. Allen, presiding 
administrative law judge for the Industrial Commission of Utah, 
ruled that "Kirk Mower was an independent contractor and not an 
employee of Lynn Transportation." Marv Mower v. Lvnn 
Transportation, Case No. 9100271 (Industrial Commission of Utah) 
(Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dated July 22, 
1992). Mower has never disputed that status in this action. 
Defendants' Memo, R. 400. 
17. Mower operated M-T Transport, his dba, as a sole 
proprietor. Defendants' Memo, R. 400; Mower Interrogatory 
Response, R. 445. 
18. No written notice was provided by Mower to the 
Industrial Commission or any insurance carrier that he, as sole 
proprietor, was to be covered by any workers' compensation 
insurance policy applicable to his business. Defendants' Memo, 
R. 401. 
Based on these undisputed facts, Defendants moved for 
summary judgment. Central to Defendants' arguments in their 
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motion for summary judgment were the following provisions in the 
undisputed Agreement between Mower and Lynn: 
The Contractor [Mower] shall maintain in force and 
effect Workman's Compensation Insurance (with All 
States Endorsement) to the full extent of statutory 
limits of all states in which work will be 
performed pursuant to the terms of this Agreement 
covering itself, its drivers, driver's helpers and 
laborers employed by it in the performance of this 
Agreement, and shall furnish CARRIER [Lynn] with a 
copy of policy evidencing such coverage or a 
Certificate of Insurance in lieu thereof. 
CONTRACTOR agrees to protect, defend, indemnify, 
and hold CARRIER harmless from and against any 
claim, loss or damage brought or alleged by 
CONTRACTOR or its employees against CARRIER for any 
injury, including death to CONTRACTOR or its 
employees resulting from the performance of this 
Agreement. 
R. 416. In addition, it is undisputed that the Agreement further 
provided: 
This Agreement constitutes the entire Agreement and 
understanding between the parties and shall not be 
modified, altered, changed or amended in any 
respect unless in writing and signed by both 
parties. 
R. 417. 
Lynn and Alexander moved for summary judgment on the basis 
that the contract assigned the duty to obtain workers' 
compensation insurance to Mower, and that his attempts to shift 
this obligation on to defendants were therefore legally 
insufficient. In fact, Lynn maintained that the contract obliged 
Mower to indemnify it from the very claim he was asserting 
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against Lynn. In addition, Defendants moved on the basis that 
Mower, as a sole proprietor of an independent business, would not 
have been eligible for workers' compensation benefits, so that 
the policy Mower claimed Defendants should have bought on his 
behalf would not have covered him in any event.1 
Judge Moffat granted the Defendants' motion for summary 
judgment on both bases, as well as granting the Defendants' 
motions to strike the Affidavits of Jerry Anderegg, a supposed 
expert in insurance whose affidavits were submitted by Mower in 
an attempt to salvage his case. R. 550-553.2 In a later 
motion, Lynn moved for summary judgment on its counterclaims, 
submitting as undisputed the amount owing on account from Mower 
and its attorney's fees expended in defending the action. R. 
595-606. Mower stipulated that he did not dispute the amounts or 
reasonableness of these claims, R. 591-594, but argued that the 
Agreement did not permit indemnification in this case. R. 617-
1
 Defendants also moved to dismiss Mower's claims for 
indemnification from potential claims by Mower's common-law wife, 
who Mower contended was an employee hurt in a separate on-the-job 
injury. R. 412-413. After the Industrial Commission rejected 
Mary Mower's workers' compensation claims, Mower abandoned this 
claim, and in fact went on later to contend that he was the only 
employee of his company. R. 473; see R. 513. 
2
 Mower has not appealed the granting of the motions to 
strike the Anderegg Affidavits, having failed to identify or 
brief any issue regarding the trial court's granting the motion 
to strike. 
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620. The trial court rejected this argument, granted Lynn's 
motion and directed the entry of judgment in favor of Lynn in the 
amount of $34,398.52. R. 633-635. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
This case concerns the enforcement of a clear contractual 
provision assigning the duty to obtain workers' compensation 
insurance for Mower's company to Mower. The contract is 
integrated on its face, and there was no evidence submitted below 
to rebut the presumption of its integration. In fact, Mower has 
repeatedly conceded that his contract with Lynn required him to 
obtain the workers' compensation insurance. Contrary contractual 
duties cannot be implied in the face of the written Agreement's 
clear provision. There is therefore no genuine dispute 
concerning the contractual apportionment of that duty to Mower. 
There is likewise no issue of fact concerning the 
equitable doctrine of estoppel. Mower's alleged "reliance" on 
the defendants' actions and inactions was not, as a matter of 
law, reasonable. More importantly, the estoppel doctrine could 
only be applied to excuse Mower from his contractual obligation 
if Mower was without fault in this situation. Mower clearly 
bears significant fault for his failure to comply with his 
contractual commitments and obtain workers' compensation 
insurance. 
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Mower's tort and other common law claims cannot alter the 
contractual duties established by the Agreement between Mower and 
Lynn. The duties here arise out of a contractual relationship, 
and imposing contrary tort duties on Lynn would deprive Lynn of 
its contractual rights, and frustrate the ability of all 
commercial parties to govern their respective business 
responsibilities to one another through contract. Moreover, 
because Mower's Agreement with Lynn requires him to indemnify 
Lynn for the very claim he asserts here, any tort claim amounts 
to a zero-sum proposition: Mower is contractually obligated to 
repay Lynn for every dollar Lynn is required to pay for Mower's 
tort claims. 
In addition, even if contract or tort law imposed a duty 
on Lynn to obtain workers' compensation insurance for Mower's 
company, Mower's injuries would not have been covered under such 
a policy, so Mower is undamaged by Lynn's alleged failure to 
obtain such a policy. Mower is a sole proprietor of his 
business, and would have had to affirmatively give notice to both 
the insurance carrier and the Utah State Industrial Commission 
prior to being covered under a workers' compensation policy. It 
is undisputed that Mower never gave such notice to anyone, so he 
would not have been covered. The damages he claims (measured by 
the amount of workers' compensation benefits he would have 
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received under the policy he claims Lynn should have obtained for 
him) equal zero. 
Finally, the trial court correctly ordered the entry of 
judgment against Mower and in favor of Lynn in the amount of 
$34,3 98.52. Properly interpreted, the indemnification clause in 
this case encompasses all the claims asserted in this action by 
Mower. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THERE IS NO ISSUE CONCERNING THE TERMS OF MOWER'S CONTRACT 
WITH LYNN. 
A, Mower Did Not Contest The Issue Of Integration Below. 
Mower's first point on appeal asserts that the trial court 
erred in holding that the parol evidence rule barred his claims 
because issues of fact existed regarding the contract's 
integration. Mower did not raise this issue below. On the 
contrary, Mower conceded that his contract with Lynn required him 
to obtain workers' compensation insurance. Mower's Memorandum In 
Response To Defendants' Joint Motion For Summary Judgment, R. 465 
("Plaintiff admits he agreed at the time he was hired as an 
independent contractor, that he would obtain workers' compensation 
insurance . . . ") and at R. 469 ("all parties admit plaintiff had 
a duty under the contract to carry worker's compensation 
insurance11); Mower's Response to Motion For Summary Judgment on 
Counterclaim, R. 618 ("The contract at issue places responsibility 
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on plaintiff to obtain worker's compensation insurance"). Rather 
than contest the contractual theories asserted by defendants in 
their motion for summary judgment, Mower chose to rely solely on 
his estoppel and negligence theories. R. 468 through 475. He 
raised no argument, and pointed to no fact, concerning the written 
Agreement's integration. 
This Court will not consider arguments raised for the first 
time on appeal. Ona Intern. (USA) v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 
447, 455 n.31 (Utah 1993); LeBaron & Assoc, v. Rebel Enter., 823 
P.2d 479, 482-84 (Utah App. 1991); Barson v. E.R. Scaiibb & Sons, 
Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 837-838 (Utah 1984); Franklin Fin, v. New 
Empire Dev. Co.. 659 P.2d 1040, 1044-45 (Utah 1983). At the trial 
court level, Defendants' assertions that the Agreement was 
integrated went unchallenged.3 R. 404 & 508. Indeed, those 
arguments were conceded. It would be unfair to permit Mower to 
change his legal position and now argue that the contract was 
integrated. 
3
 Mower briefed only his estoppel theory (in an attempt to 
defeat Defendants' reliance on the Agreement to bar Mower's 
claims), his negligence theory, and argued that he had been 
damaged by defendants' conduct. R. 465-475. He did not brief or 
otherwise pursue his claims of fraud, agency, or Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 323. Thus, these theories have likewise not 
been preserved for appeal. Ona Intern.. 850 P.2d at 455, n.31; 
LeBaron & Assoc., 823 P.2d at 482-84; Barson, 682 P.2d at 837-38; 
Franklin Fin., 659 P.2d at 1044-45. 
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B. There Is No Issue of Fact Concerning the 
Agreement's Integration. 
Even if Mower had properly raised the legal issue of 
integration below, the trial court was correct in concluding, based 
on the undisputed facts before the court, that the Agreement was 
integrated. R. 551. The Agreement at issue in this case contains 
an express integration clause, in which Mower and Lynn agreed that: 
This Agreement constitutes the entire Agreement and 
understanding between the parties and shall not be 
modified, altered, changed or amended in any respect 
unless in writing and signed by the parties. 
R. 417. Such a declaration, unambiguous on its face, is regarded 
by many authorities as conclusive proof of the issue of integration 
by Professors Corbin and Williston. 4 S. Williston, Williston on 
Contracts, § 633 (3d ed. 1961) ; A. L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, 
§ 578 at 403, 411 (1960) cited in, Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's 
Way Marketing, Ltd., 753 P.2d 507, 512 (Utah App. 1988). "By 
limiting the contract to the provisions that are in writing, the 
parties are definitely expressing an intention to nullify 
antecedent understandings or agreements. They are making the 
document a complete integration." Corbin, at 411. While Utah 
apparently admits evidence to rebut such a written statement in a 
contract, Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985) 
(dicta), this same case also creates a presumption of integration 
in such cases, requiring that a party claiming the contract is not 
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integrated come forward with evidence demonstrating as much. Id. 
No such evidence was offered by Mower. 
Mower and Lynn agreed that their mutual responsibilities 
were set forth in the written Contractor Operating Agreement; Mower 
is now seeking to avoid that Agreement by contending that, instead 
of the unambiguous provision in that Agreement assigning the 
obligation to obtain workers' compensation insurance to Mower, an 
ambiguous and previously executed insurance form imposed that duty 
on Lynn. 
The Agreement's terms are clear; it was Mower's job to 
obtain workers' compensation insurance for his business, and the 
parties intended that their written contract set forth all of their 
obligations to each other. To rely on conduct extrinsic to the 
contract's clear written terms to impose a contrary duty on Lynn is 
to ignore the express terms of the parties' contract, as well as 
Mower's repeated admissions of that contractual duty. In addition, 
to ignore the Agreement's integration clause frustrates the entire 
purpose of that clause and ignores the utter failure of Mower to 
come forward with any evidence indicating that either party 
intended that the integration clause means something other than 
what it plainly says. Mower did not demonstrate a genuine issue of 
fact that the parties intended collateral representations to be 
incorporated in their contract. The only theories raised by Mower 
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to avoid this obligation were estoppel and negligence theories. 
This Court should not permit Mower to rewrite his legal theories on 
appeal. 
Here, the parties agreed that the written contract was an 
integration of all prior negotiations. Agreement, R. 417. It was 
intended as a complete statement of the relative responsibilities 
of the contractor and the carrier. Mower's factually unsupported 
attempt to circumvent the express provisions of the written 
contract ignore this basic and undisputed fact. 
C. The Parol Evidence Rule Bars the Use of 
Collateral Statements and Actions to Vary 
the Terms of Lynn's Contract with Mower. 
Fundamentally, this case is about enforcing the express 
terms of a written contract. Whether the case is approached 
through tort, estoppel or other theories, at root Mower is 
attempting to disavow the written instrument that the parties 
previously agreed represented a complete summation of their 
relationship. None of the facts brought forth by Mower justify 
setting aside that contract. Mower promised that he would be 
responsible for obtaining necessary workers' compensation 
insurance and promised to indemnify Lynn from any on-the-job 
injuries to his employees or to himself. That express clause 
precludes imposing a contradictory duty on defendants. Rio Alaom 
Corp. v. Jimco Ltd.. 618 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1980) ("An express 
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agreement or covenant relating to a specific contract right 
excludes the possibility of an implied covenant of a different or 
contradictory nature"). 
The parol evidence rule is a substantive rule of contract 
law designed to protect the ability of parties to memorialize 
their agreements in writing, without fear that the whole gamut of 
their dealings will be used to change their final agreement. The 
Utah Supreme Court has summarized the rule: 
When parties have reduced to writing what appears 
to be a complete and certain agreement it will be 
conclusively presumed, in the absence of fraud, 
that the writing contains the whole of the 
agreement between the parties; and the parol 
evidence of contemporaneous conversations, 
representations or statements will not be received 
for the purpose of varying or adding to the terms 
of the written agreement. 
Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261, 501 P.2d 266, 270 
(1972); accord. Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 
1985) ("Simply stated, the rule operates in the absence of fraud 
to exclude contemporaneous conversations, statements, or 
representations offered for the purpose of varying or adding to 
the terms of an integrated contract").4 
4
 There is no evidence of fraud here. The only person who 
Mower accuses of making misleading statements is Linda Granath, a 
friend of Mower's from his prior job. Neither she nor Lynn would 
have any motive to mislead Mower about the need to obtain 
worker's compensation insurance. On the contrary, such insurance 
was important enough to Lynn to cause it to insert an express 
(continued...) 
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Mower contends that the one-page insurance form was 
offered not to change the parties' contract, but to clarify the 
manner in which Mower was to fulfill his duty. This is 
sophistry. Mower's argument necessarily seeks to shift a 
contractual duty clearly imposed on Mower over to Lynn, by 
arguing that the form constituted a separate agreement. Such a 
construction is directly contrary to the parties' express 
acknowledgement that the Lynn/Mower Agreement reflected "the 
entire Agreement and understanding between the parties." 
Mower seeks to offer evidence of collateral statements and 
actions in order to shift an obligation expressly assigned to him 
by his written Agreement with Lynn, On its face, and on the 
undisputed factual record, the parties intended the Agreement to 
serve as a complete expression of their arrangement. If the 
parol evidence rule (and for that matter, the concept of written 
contracts) is to have any vitality, it is the written Agreement 
that must control, not Mower's self-serving and subjective 
understanding. 
4
 (...continued) 
provision in its contract requiring the contractor to obtain that 
insurance for himself. There is no evidence in the record 
supporting any intent on Defendants' part to mislead OMower. 
Although challenged by Lynn to present such evidence in response 
to Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, R. 404, plaintiff 
offered none. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT ESTOPPEL IS 
UNAVAILABLE TO MOWER AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Rather than dispute that Mower had agreed that he would be 
responsible for obtaining workers' compensation insurance, Mower 
sought to avoid his Agreement with Lynn by invoking the doctrine 
of equitable estoppel. Contrary to his briefing before this 
Court, Mower did not plead any affirmative promissory estoppel 
claims; rather, his estoppel theory was presented solely as a 
response to Lynn's position that Mower may not impose duties on 
Lynn that contradict those duties spelled out in the Agreement.5 
It is well established in this state that "it is not for a 
court to rewrite a contract improvidently entered into at arm's 
length or to change the bargain indirectly on the basis of 
supposed equitable principles." Dalton v. Jerico Constr. Co., 
642 P.2d 748, 750 (Utah 1982) quoted in Hal Taylor Assoc, v. 
Unionamerica, Inc.. 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982). As the Utah 
Supreme Court has explained: 
The basic rule of contract interpretation is that 
the intent of the parties is to be ascertained from 
the content of the instrument itself, the rationale 
for the rule being to preserve the sanctity of 
5
 Nor would the pleading of a promissory estoppel case have 
made any difference. Not only would such a theory fail as a 
matter of law for lack of reasonable reliance (as discussed 
infra), but such a contract would also necessarily require 
implying contractual duties contrary to the express Agreement. 
Utah courts do not imply such contradictory duties. Rio Alaom v. 
Jimco Ltd., 618 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1980). 
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written instruments. Each contract provision is to 
be considered in relation to all of the others with 
a view toward giving affect to all and ignoring 
none. It is only when an ambiguity exists which 
cannot be reconciled by an objective and reasonable 
interpretation of the contract as a whole that a 
resort may be had to the use of extrinsic evidence. 
Utah Vallev Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060, 1061-62 (Utah 1981). 
Application of the doctrine of estoppel here would deprive the 
written contract between the parties of its intended force, and 
effect an end run around the parol evidence rule. 
A. As a Matter of Law, Mower Could Not Have 
Reasonably Relied on Lynn's Statements 
and Actions. 
Estoppel requires some action or representation made by 
the party to be estopped, inconsistent with a later position, on 
which the party asserting estoppel reasonably relies. Ceco Corp. 
v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969-970 (Utah 1989). 
The undisputed facts of this case, as a matter of law, cannot 
support a finding that Mower behaved reasonably in assuming he 
had workers' compensation insurance.6 
It is undisputed in this case that Mower's three-to-five 
minute conversation with a Lynn employee, on which Mower bases 
6
 The arguments in this section related to reasonable 
reliance apply equally to Mower's claims of promissory estoppel 
(unpleaded below, but asserted here) as well as his tort claims 
of fraud, negligent misrepresentation and his theory of agency. 
Amended Complaint, 1 52, 57, & 82. R. 304-307. As stated above, 
however, none of those theories has been properly preserved for 
appeal. 
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his entire case, took place prior to the signing of the contract 
between Lynn and Mower. Defendants' Statement of Undisputed 
Facts, R. 398, Mower Deposition, R. 424-428, 432 & 434. Mower's 
theory of misrepresentation (the basis for all of his tort and 
estoppel claims) is that during this brief conversation, Linda 
Granath, in giving him the form with the workers' compensation 
blank, somehow committed both Lynn and Alexander to obtain such 
insurance for Mower. Significantly, however, Mower does not 
testify that Granath ever said she would obtain such insurance. 
He seems to have simply assumed that that was the case from their 
brief conversation. Mower testifies that Granath told him that 
getting such a policy through Lynn's carrier would be expensive, 
and would require adding a rider to the existing policy. He does 
not testify that Granath ever committed to doing anything more 
than faxing in the form with his ,fX"-mark on it: 
Q. (by Mr. Stone) When Linda [Granath] told you 
that she would have to add a 
rider to get you on the 
Worker's Compensation policy 
that Lynn had for its drivers 
what did you say? 
A. Verbatim I don't know. Basically what 
I said was: I won't have time to be 
dealing with all of this stuff and 
operate the truck, so what we're going 
to handle at the company let's get it 
handled. 
Q. Did she tell you she would get 
Worker's Comp? 
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A. No. I was never told that there would 
be a problem with it. 
Q. So how did you leave it with her? 
A. My understanding was that they was 
just going to - the - whatever the 
increase in Workman's Comp would be 
would be billed on with the rest of 
the insurance that they were 
providing. 
Mower Deposition, R. 426-427. In response to questioning by 
counsel for Alexander, Mower elaborated: 
Q. (by Mr. Plant) Did she ever indicate to you 
how she was going to add you 
onto their policy? 
A- No. The only thing that was indicated 
to me is that this paper would go back 
to Alexander & Alexander, who 
underwrites all of the insurance for -
I don't know whether it's ConAgra or 
strictly for Lynn Transportation, but 
that it would be computed through 
Alexander & Alexander. 
Mower Deposition, R. 433. Nor did the form submitted suggest 
that it would effect workers' compensation insurance for Mower. 
It merely indicates "coverage desired," and requests that "any 
premiums I may owe the insurance carrier" be deducted from 
Mower's checks. R. 418. It cannot be construed as either an 
application or a binder. 
According to Mower, Granath indicated that Lynn 
Transportation did not provide workers' compensation insurance 
for its independent contractors as opposed to Lynn's drivers and 
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other employees, and that such a policy, if purchased through 
Lynn's insurer "would have to be added" as an expensive "rider" 
to the Lynn policy. Mower Deposition, R. 432. She did not 
commit to supplying workers' compensation insurance to Mower. 
Mower Deposition, p. 427. At best, she committed only to sending 
in the application as filled out by Mower and it is undisputed 
that she did just that. R. 398. 
Mower contends that he "assumed" he obtained workers' 
compensation insurance by marking a single box on a facsimile 
form. He did not discuss price. R. 426. Even though he 
admitted that such facts would be important, he testified that he 
did not discuss how many employees he was going to have, or the 
fact that he wanted coverage for himself, as well. R. 427, 431. 
He claims he never received any certificates for any kind of 
insurance. He spoke with one individual for less than five 
minutes concerning all the various forms of insurance necessary 
for his trucking business. By his own admission, this person did 
not tell him that she would obtain workers' compensation 
insurance for M-T Transport; she told him, according to Mower, 
that a rider would have to be created and that "expensive" 
premiums would have to be calculated after the "paper work" went 
"back to Alexander & Alexander." Mower Deposition, R. 433. 
Mower never received a rider or any other indication that his 
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insurance was in effect, and he never saw a calculation of 
premium. No reasonable person could "assume," under these 
circumstances, that his business had purchased insurance for its 
employees and owner. 
B. One Cannot Reasonably Rely on a Statement 
Contrary to a Subsequent Integrated Written 
Contract. 
More importantly, it cannot, as a matter of law, be 
reasonable for Mower to rely on statements directly at odds with 
the terms of his written contract. Larson v. Wycoff Co., 624 
P.2d 1151 (Utah 1981); Huck v. Huck. 734 P.2d 417 (Utah 1986). 
In Larson v. Wycoff Co.. an employee sought insurance 
benefits for claims he incurred after becoming a part-time 
employee. His company's insurance handbook stated that such 
benefits were only available to full-time employees. When he 
converted from full-time employment to part-time employment, the 
company mistakenly continued to pay some benefits. When the 
company ultimately stopped paying, the employee argued that the 
company should be estopped from denying the continued coverage 
under the insurance policy for full-time employees. The Utah 
Supreme Court rejected this argument and upheld the trial court's 
summary judgment in favor of the defendants, stating: 
A party claiming an estoppel cannot rely on 
representations or acts if they are contrary to his 
own knowledge of the truth or if he had the means 
by which with reasonable diligence he could 
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ascertain the true situation. . . . Furthermore, 
a determination of the issue of estoppel is not 
dependent on the subjective state of mind of the 
person claiming he was misled, but rather is to be 
based on an objective test, i.e., what would a 
reasonable person conclude under the circumstances. 
. . . It was not reasonable for plaintiff to rely 
on additional payments as assuring the continuation 
of his coverage. He did not discuss his status in 
relation to employee benefits with anyone in a 
position to speak for the company, but he had read 
the handbook and knew insurance benefits were 
available only to full-time employees. While he 
undoubtedly welcomed the payments mistakenly made 
by Wycoff, he should have known that he was no 
longer eligible and that an error may have been 
made. 
Id., at 1155-1156. In the case at bar, after the supposed 
misleading representations of Linda Granath, Mower signed a 
contract explicitly accepting the sole responsibility for 
obtaining workers' compensation insurance for his business. As 
in Larson v. Wycoff, it is simply not reasonable for Mower to 
have assumed that, notwithstanding the explicit terms of the 
contract, Lynn or Alexander would provide this workers' 
compensation insurance for him.7 He is charged with knowledge 
7
 Additional support for this proposition can be found 
in Huck v. Huck. 734 P.2d 417, a divorce case in which a husband 
contended that the wife was estopped from claiming any interest 
in certain real properties acquired by the couple: 
Plaintiff points to several occasions when 
defendant stated she wanted nothing to do with the 
properties and claimed no interest therein. 
However, since the prenuptial agreement clearly 
(continued...) 
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of the provisions of his Agreement. No one ever told him such 
insurance had been obtained, and he could easily have found out 
by simple inquiry. 
It is significant that in both Huck v. Huck and Larson v. 
Wycoff Co., the statements alleged to create an estoppel occurred 
after the written agreement between the parties. Here it is 
undisputed that the supposed oral misrepresentations were made 
prior to the execution of a written contract. In such a case, 
issues of estoppel are more properly dealt with using traditional 
notions of the parol evidence rule and the function of 
integration clauses within written contracts. In any event, 
however, in a situation where the supposed representations 
creating an estoppel occur prior to a written agreement instead 
of subsequent to the agreement, the arguments against application 
of estoppel are even stronger than when the reverse is true. 
Leaving aside the integrity and purpose of written contracts, how 
can one "rely" on an oral statement and then sign a conflicting 
written agreement? Reasonable reliance is plainly doubtful in a 
case where inconsistent representations are made after the 
7
 (...continued) 
gave her an interest, plaintiff could not have 
reasonably relied on her gratuitous oral 
disclaimers. 
Id., at 420-21. 
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party's written agreement; but after all, such agreements can 
conceivably be changed after their execution. It is 
preposterous, however, to claim that one relied on such an 
inconsistent statement made prior to the contrary written 
contract and later continued to do so even after signing it. To 
accept such an argument (absent evidence of active fraud on the 
other party's part) would void the effect of the integration 
clause agreed to by the parties and contained in the written 
Agreement at issue here. 
C. Lynn's Conduct Was Insufficient to Justify 
Application of Estoppel. 
Furthermore, the undisputed facts in this case do not 
justify the application of equitable estoppel, even if the 
doctrine were available in the face of a contrary written 
agreement. For estoppel to be applied: 
The promise or representation relied on must be 
sufficiently definite and certain that the 
plaintiff acting as a reasonable and prudent person 
under the circumstances would be justified in 
placing reliance upon it; and in case of 
uncertainty or doubt the responsibility is upon the 
plaintiff to ascertain the facts before acting upon 
it. 
Petty v. Qindv Mfg. Corp., 17 Utah 2d 32, 404 P.2d 30, 32 (1965). 
There is nothing definite about the statements of Linda Granath, 
as testified to by Kirk Mower. Mower has failed to point to any 
126196.1 26 
evidence demonstrating a representation that is "sufficiently 
definite and certain" to justify application of estoppel. 
What Mower relied on was his vague assumption that Lynn 
would obtain insurance for him. Based on the three- to five-
minute conversation and a single "X" mark, Mower now contends 
that Lynn promised to get him not only workers' compensation 
insurance, but also promised to determine that Mower himself 
desired to be considered an employee under that policy and take 
the affirmative step of notifying both the State Industrial 
Commission and the insurance carrier of that desire. This entire 
assumption is made by Mower despite the fact that no one ever 
told him they were going to get him workers' compensation 
insurance. Mower Deposition, R. 427. He made these assumptions 
notwithstanding the fact that he never discussed whether he, as a 
sole proprietor, would be considered an employee, notwithstanding 
the fact that he never discussed how many employees he 
anticipated having, and notwithstanding the fact that he never 
discussed rates or length of term. Most importantly, he made 
this assumption in the face of his express promise to the 
contrary, contained in the written contract he signed, that hg 
would obtain the workers' compensation insurance required by law. 
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D. Mower's Conduct Precludes Application Of Estoppel. 
In addition, application of the doctrine of estoppel 
requires that the person invoking estoppel be "without fault." 
Masters v. Worslev, 777 P.2d 499, 503 (Utah App. 1989); Morgan v. 
Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1976). In this 
case, the undisputed facts demonstrate ample fault on the part of 
Mower. This becomes abundantly clear if, for the purposes of 
argument, the Court considers how estoppel might apply against 
Mower. From defendants' standpoint, Mower signed an express 
written contract that he would obtain workers' compensation 
insurance and indemnify Lynn for any claims for injuries incurred 
b- him or his employees in the cc rse of performing the contract. 
Mower contends that he reasonably relied on defendants' supposed 
representations despite his knowledge of the content of the 
contract, the fact that he had never discussed rates, terms, or 
number of employees to be covered, and the fact that he never 
received any confirmation that he had received workers' 
compensation insurance. Lynn, on the other hand, relied on 
Mower's statement by permitting him to drive the truck; it is 
undisputed that the contract was an express precondition to Mower 
ever carrying a load on Lynn's behalf. The undisputed facts make 
it readily apparent which party should bear the burden of this 
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loss—Mower is hardly "without fault" and cannot take refuge in 
the doctrine of estoppel. 
The terms of the parties' written contract are undisputed. 
The vague and inconclusive nature of the representations alleged 
to have been made by Defendants are set forth in Mower's 
deposition testimony. It is undisputed that his conversation 
lasted less than five minutes. It is undisputed that no 
representative of Lynn ever told Mower that they would obtain 
workers' compensation insurance for him. It is undisputed that 
no one discussed how many employees he would have, and that Mower 
never mentioned his desire to be covered, as sole proprietor of 
his trucking business. These facts are more than sufficient to 
legally preclude the application of estoppel to invalidate the 
express terms of the parties' written contract, and to bar 
plaintiffs' claims that Mower should be excused from his 
contractually-assumed responsibilities. 
III. MOWER'S TORT CLAIMS CANNOT BE MAINTAINED. 
Independent of the specific reasons stated above, because 
the contract executed by and between Mower and Lynn 
Transportation defined the duty regarding the acquisition of 
workers' compensation coverage, Mower's alleged causes of action 
may only sound in contract. See Allred v. Brown, 261 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 42 (Utah App. 1995); Interwest Constr. v. Palmer, 886 P.2d 
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92, 101 (Utah App. 1994); Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 
795, 799-800 (Utah 1985). 
The parties' contract in this case clearly and 
unambiguously defines the duty with respect to the acquisition of 
workers' compensation coverage. That definition, as an element 
of the contract, was a bargained-for condition in the 
relationship between Mower and Lynn Transportation. As such, the 
Agreement controls and Mower's action is limited to the rights 
established by that contract. Mower's attempt to avoid these 
contractual duties by asserting numerous tort claims is 
unavailing, given Utah courts' repeated recognition that when 
parties define their relationship and duties contractually, 
liability with respect to such duties may not lie in tort.8 
This distinction between tort and contract law was recently 
reemphasized by this Court in Interwest Construction: 
In Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 
P.2d 795 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court 
addressed the often-blurred distinction between 
tort and contract liability. Id. at 799-800. The 
Court clarified this distinction by holding that if 
8
 "In some cases an act or omission resulting in a breach 
of contract may also constitute a breach of duty that is not 
subsumed by the contract and may thereby give rise to a cause of 
action sounding in tort." "[A] party may recover in tort[, 
therefore,] for breaches of duties which are independent of 
contract terms." Interwest Constr., 886 P.2d at 101 (citation 
omitted) (emphasis added). Mower, however, has not plead a 
breach of any duty independent of the duties assigned in the 
Agreement between Mower and Lynn Transportation. 
126196.1 30 
parties arrange rights, duties, and obligations 
under a contract, any cause of action for breach of 
those contractually defined obligations, rights, or 
duties lies in contract, not in tort. Id. In the 
words of the Court, when "the duties or obligations 
of the parties are contractual rather than 
fiduciary . . . a breach of those express or 
implied duties can give rise only to a cause of 
action in contract, not one in tort." Id. at 800. 
Interwest Constr., 886 P.2d at 101. See also Allred, 261 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 44 (holding the same with respect to duties defined 
in a bailment contract). 
The principle expressed in Interwest Construction, Beck 
and Allred is not new, it is simply the concept that parties are 
free to make choices and define duties and their relationships in 
contract - commonly referred to as "freedom of contract." 
"[W]here the parties are otherwise competent and 
free to make a choice as to the provisions of their 
contract, it is fundamental that [the] terms of the 
contract made by the parties must govern their 
rights and duties." 
* * * 
The very notion of contract is the consensual 
formation of relationships with bargained-for 
duties. An essential corollary of the concept of 
bargained-for duties is bargained-for liabilities 
for failure to perform them. 
• * • 
The effect of confusing the concept of contractual 
duties, which are voluntarily bargained for, with 
the concept of tort duties, which are largely 
imposed by law, would be to nullify a substantial 
part of what the parties expressly bargained for--
limited liability. . . . No reason appears to 
support such a radical shift from bargained-for 
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duties and liabilities to the imposition of duties 
and liabilities that were expressly negated by the 
parties themselves when they decided to abandon 
their status as legal strangers and define their 
relationship by contract. Tort law proceeds from a 
long historical evolution of externally imposed 
duties and liabilities. Contract law proceeds from 
an even longer historical evolution of bargained-
for duties and liabilities. The careless and 
unnecessary blanket confusion of tort and contract 
would undermine the carefully evolved utility of 
both. 
Isler v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 749 F.2d 22, 23 (10th Cir. 1984) 
(quotations and citations omitted). 
It is important to recognize that the damages Mower seeks 
in this action are purely economic, rather than direct damages 
for his physical injuries. There is no claim in this case that 
Lynn bears any responsibility for Mower's accident and resulting 
injuries, or even any claim that Lynn was statutorily required to 
provide insurance for Mower's on-the-job injury. Rather, Mower 
contends that Lynn is liable for having failed to provide him 
coverage for the possibility of those injuries based on Lynn's 
conduct in contracting with Mower. Accordingly, the duty Mower 
claims was breached by Lynn was a duty to provide a purely 
economic benefit rather than to exercise care for Mower's 
personal safety. That type of duty is governed by contract law, 
and may not be imposed in the abstract under a tort theory. 
Maack v. Resource Design and Constr., Inc., 875 P.2d 570, 580 
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(Utah App. 1994) .9 Whether Mower characterizes his claims as 
contract or tort, Lynn- had no duty to secure the economic benefit 
of workers' compensation insurance for him. 
Finally, as a practical point, there is simply no room for 
recognizing both contract and tort theories in this case. If the 
Agreement is fully enforced, Mower has agreed to indemnify and 
hold Lynn harmless from "any claim . . . for any injury . . . 
resulting from the performance of this Agreement." R. 416. It 
is undisputed that Mower received his injuries (for which he 
seeks compensating benefits) while performing the Agreement with 
Lynn; he was hurt when his truck ran off the road while he was 
carrying a load on behalf of Lynn. This being the case, he is 
contractually obligated to indemnify Lynn from his own claims. 
Success against Lynn on his supposedly separate tort claims only 
expands his contractual obligation to indemnify Lynn. This 
result is no surprise; the plain intent of the indemnification 
provision, which appears in the same clause as the provision 
requiring Mower to obtain workers' compensation insurance, was to 
9
 "Contract law protects expectancy interests created 
through agreement between the parties, while tort law protects 
individuals and their property from physical harm by imposing a 
duty to exercise reasonable care." Maack v. Resource Design and 
Const., Inc.. 875 P.2d 570, 580 (Utah App. 1994). Mower's 
theories of non-intentional torts fail because his claim is for 
purely economic loss, and such losses are recoverable only 
pursuant to contract. Id.; Schafir v. Harricran, 879 P.2d 1384 
(Utah App. 1994) . 
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shift the entire burden of complying with the workers' 
compensation statutes on to Mower, the independent contractor. 
If that portion of the Agreement is given its intended effect, 
there can be no tort claim by Mower against Lynn based on a 
different apportionment of responsibility under those laws. 
The Agreement expressly provides that Mower has the duty 
to acquire workers' compensation coverage for himself and any 
employees that he retains. This was a bargained-for condition in 
the contract, whereby Mower expressly accepted the obligation to 
secure workers' compensation coverage with respect to his 
relationship with Lynn Transportation, as that relationship was 
defined in the contract. Consequently, any cause of action 
regarding the failure to secure workers' compensation coverage is 
governed by contract and no cause of action in tort may lie. 
Accordingly, all of Mower's tort claims - to the extent they are 
premised on the alleged failure to acquire workers' compensation 
coverage - were properly rejected by the trial court. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE 
BASIS THAT MOWER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
BENEFITS. 
Even if Lynn and Alexander were somehow obligated to 
obtain workers' compensation insurance for Mower's business, 
neither of the two injuries alleged by Mower would have resulted 
in any benefits under an ordinary workers' compensation insurance 
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policy. Accordingly, Defendants are not liable to Mower for any 
damages in this action. 
Mower acknowledges that he is the sole proprietor of M-T 
Transport, and that it was in that capacity that he contracted with 
Lynn. 
Workers' compensation insurance covers the risk imposed by 
law pursuant to the workers' compensation laws. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 31A-1-301(83) (defining "workers' compensation insurance"). 
Those laws require compensation be provided employees for losses 
sustained from injuries or death arising out of and in the course 
of an employee's employment. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45. However, 
sole proprietors are not ordinarily included within this statute's 
coverage: 
A partnership or sole proprietorship may elect to 
include as an employee under this chapter any partner 
of the partnership or the owner of the sole 
proprietorship. If a partnership or sole 
proprietorship makes this election, it shall serve 
written notice upon its insurance carrier and upon 
the Commission naming the persons to be covered. No 
partner of a partnership or owner of a sole 
proprietorship is considered an employee under this 
chapter until this notice has been given. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-43(3)(a) (emphasis added). Thus, a sole 
proprietor who fails to affirmatively give notice to both the 
applicable insurance carrier and the Industrial Commission 
identifying himself as a person to be covered does not obtain 
coverage for his own injuries. 
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Here, it is undisputed that no such notice was given by any 
entity to the Industrial Commission or any insurance carrier. The 
single form filled out by Mower makes no mention that Kirk H. 
Mower, sole proprietor of M-T Transport, is to be covered by any 
workers' compensation insurance supposedly ordered by the form; 
moreover, it was never sent or intended to be sent to the 
Industrial Commission. No other form was submitted by Mower or any 
other entity. Nothing in his contract with Lynn required Mower to 
make the election to include the sole proprietor within the 
coverage of M-T Transport's required policy. Mower did not discuss 
with any representative of Lynn or Alexander whether he, as opposed 
to merely his employees, should be covered by the workers' 
compensation insurance he desired. 
This being the case, workers' compensation insurance would 
not have covered Mower's injuries received in his accident on July 
28th. He was the sole proprietor of his business, not an employee 
of M-T Transport. The damages for his medical treatment and 
alleged disability would not have been recoverable under an 
ordinary workers' compensation insurance policy. Even if Lynn and 
Alexander were obligated to obtain such a policy, they would not be 
responsible to compensate Mower for his medical or disability 
benefits. 
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Mower counters this argument by arguing that defendants 
somehow should have known that he wanted to have his own injuries 
covered as well as those of his employees. Mower's arguments 
concerning this point are based on a misreading of the parties' 
Agreement. The Agreement requires only workers' compensation 
insurance within the limits of state law. State law does not 
require sole proprietors to be insured for their on-the-job 
injuries. Workers' compensation insurance covers employees, but 
not the owners of the business unless they opt in. The Agreement 
requires nothing more. 
Contrary to Mower's unsupported assertions, the order form 
on which Mower relies makes no mention of whether the 
"Owner/Operator" referenced on the form is to be covered under any 
workers' compensation policy, as opposed to merely the business's 
employees. And Mower's arguments below that Defendants were 
obligated to provide notice to the insurance carrier and the 
Commission on his behalf stretches Mower's theory to the point of 
absurdity. Mower has pointed to no evidence to counter the 
undisputed fact that Mower never discussed how many employees he 
anticipated employing and never discussed whether he, as opposed to 
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merely his employees, would be covered under this supposed 
policy.10 
The North Carolina case cited by Mower, Garrett v. North 
Carolina Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 249 S.E.2d 808 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978) 
is therefore plainly inapposite. In that case, a partner in the 
business had specifically requested that he be covered under the 
policy, and premiums were calculated and collected from him based 
on that request. None of these elements are present in this case. 
Similarly, Mower's argument on appeal that he was unable to 
notify the insurance carrier until he was provided with a policy 
10
 Plaintiffs submitted the affidavits of a supposed 
insurance "expert," Jerry Anderegg, who purported to testify that 
it is the insurance agent's duty to inform the insurance carrier 
that the owner is to be insured as a worker. The trial court 
granted defendants' Motions To Strike Anderegg's Affidavits. 
Mower has not briefed or identified any issue in this appeal 
arguing that the granting of those Motions to Strike was 
improper. Even if the Court were inclined to review that 
decision, however, the Court can reject Anderegg's unsupported 
testimony out of hand. Anderegg's conclusory testimony that it 
is the insurance agent's "duty" to notify the insurance carrier 
that the sole proprietor's injuries are to be covered is directly 
contrary to Utah statutory law. The statute requires that the 
sole proprietorship "shall serve written notice upon its 
insurance carrier and upon the commission naming the person to be 
covered." Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-43 (3) (a). The insurance agent 
is the carrier's agent, not Mower's; the statute requires the 
sole proprietorship to serve the notice on the carrier. Anderegg 
appears to contend that the insurance carrier was obligated to 
serve the notice on itself. Oral, or implied notice, as argued 
here by plaintiffs, simply fails to meet the limiting terms of 
the statute. Anderegg's opinion cannot change express statutory 
duties imposed by the Utah Legislature on Mower. 
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misses the point. First, his ignorance of the identity of the 
carrier does not excuse him from his failure to notify the 
Industrial Commission. He certainly knew or should have known of 
that entity's location. Second, this argument fails to accommodate 
the necessary implications of Mower's theory of reliance. He 
claims that he thought workers' compensation insurance had been 
obtained. Amended Complaint, f 25, R 301 ("The acts of defendants 
and each of them caused Mower to believe that he carried workers' 
compensation insurance as required by law and by the contract"). 
That being the case, Mower has no excuse for failing to notify the 
appropriate entities of his desire to opt in, as a sole proprietor, 
to the workers' compensation system. Alternatively, if he thought 
he was still waiting for Defendants to supply him with a policy, he 
had no business driving. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ENTERED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR 
OF LYNN ON LYNN'S CLAIM FOR INDEMNITY. 
Mower did not contest any of the statements of material 
undisputed facts submitted by Lynn in support of its motion for 
summary judgment on its counterclaims. Significantly, Mower did 
not contest, by way of affidavit or citation to any other material 
in the record undisputed Fact No. 2: 
2. On or about July 28, 1990, Mower was injured in 
an accident while driving his tractor-trailer in 
the course of performing the Contractor 
Operating Agreement between Lynn and Mower. At 
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the time, Mower was hauling a load for Lynn and 
was injured when his truck ran off the road. 
Mower did not contest the reasonableness of the attorneys' 
fees sought by Lynn in any fashion. Instead, he confined his 
arguments to whether the indemnification clause contained in the 
Agreement applied in this case. In short, Mower contended that 
because he characterized his claims asserted in this lawsuit as not 
arising out of the contract, the contractual language does not 
apply. 
The contractual language, however, is clear: 
CONTRACTOR [Mower] agrees to protect, defend, 
indemnify, and hold CARRIER [Lynn] harmless from and 
against any claim, loss or damage brought or alleged 
by CONTRACTOR or its employees against CARRIER for 
any injury, including death, to CONTRACTOR or its 
employees resulting from the performance of this 
Agreement. 
Contractor Operating Agreement (Exhibit A to Mower's Amended 
Complaint), % 9(b). R. 416. As is plain from the above 
language, Mower's duty to indemnify Lynn is not limited to claims 
brought under the contract. It encompasses "any claim, loss or 
damage" for "any injury . . . resulting from the performance of 
this Agreement." The only question is whether the injury arose out 
of the Agreement's performance, not whether the claim is based on 
the Agreement. It is undisputed that Mower's injury occurred while 
he was performing this Agreement. 
126196.1 40 
Mower's argument that the duty to indemnify applies only to 
claims brought under the Agreement is not only unsupported by the 
grammar of the clause, but its breadth as well. The duty applies 
to claims alleged by Mower's employees, who are presumably not 
parties to this Agreement and would not be able to assert rights 
under it. A claim by such an employee would therefore not be 
brought under the Agreement, but would plainly be covered by the 
clause. 
The context of the indemnification clause also supports the 
trial court's ruling. It is found in the same paragraph as, and 
immediately follows, the provision requiring Mower to obtain 
workers' compensation insurance. It is clear from the Agreement 
that the parties intended that Mower assume the entire burden of 
complying with applicable workers' compensation laws and paying for 
any workplace injury occurring to Mower or his employees. The 
function of the indemnification clause was to protect Lynn from any 
responsibility for these duties. Plainly, part of the liability 
Lynn was seeking to avoid was that which might flow from a failure 
by Mower to obtain workers' compensation insurance, and claims that 
employees of Mower eligible for workers' compensation benefits 
might attempt to make as a result against Lynn. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-42(6) (a) (defining statutory employers). In fact, Mower did 
fail to get such insurance. As a result, h§, now seeks to recover 
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the value of workers' compensation benefits from Lynn. Mower's 
claims in this case are exactly the type of claims intended by the 
parties to fall within Mower's indemnification obligation. 
It is undisputed that the injury in this case arose out of 
the performance of the Agreement. Mower was driving a load for 
Lynn at the time of his alleged injury. It is that injury for 
which he seeks compensation. The Agreement requires Mower to 
indemnify Lynn for any claim brought against Lynn for such an 
injury. 
The amounts due under the indemnity provision and Lynn's 
other counterclaims11 were not disputed. Mower is obligated to 
pay his account and to honor his commitment to indemnify Lynn. The 
trial court properly entered summary judgment on Lynn's 
counterclaims. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly granted summary judgment to 
Defendants. Lynn's contract with Mower spells out Mower's and 
Lynn's respective duties. Mower raised no issue of fact, and did 
not even contest, Defendants' arguments that the Agreement was 
11
 Mower stipulated that judgment could be entered in the 
amount of $1,871.69 on Lynn's claim on its account with Mower. 
In addition, Mower stipulated to the reasonableness of the 
attorney's fees and costs under the indemnity provisions, and 
contested only Lynn's contractual rights to claim them from 
Mower. 
126196 1 42 
integrated. Contrary duties cannot be implied under contract or 
estoppel principles. 
Tort theory also cannot alter Lynn's and Mower's contractual 
allocation of the duty to obtain workers' compensation insurance 
for Mower's business. Mower abandoned all of his tort claims other 
than negligence, and that theory, like the others, cannot be 
reconciled with the parties' Agreement respecting the duty to 
obtain coverage. Moreover, Mower agreed to indemnify Lynn for this 
type of claim, so a tort theory nets him nothing from Lynn. 
Mower was a sole proprietor who never opted to be covered by 
the workers' compensation system. As such, even if Lynn had 
obtained a workers' compensation policy on his behalf, Mower would 
not have been eligible for the benefits which he seeks in this 
action. He has not been damaged by Lynn's supposed failure to 
obtain workers' compensation insurance on his behalf. 
Finally, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment 
on Lynn's counterclaims. The amount of those claims was not in 
dispute; the legal entitlement to the bulk of them was correctly 
decided in Lynn's favor. Mower agreed to indemnify Lynn from the 
claims he asserts in this action. 
The Court should affirm the trial court's order in all 
respects. 
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